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the individual cannot be said to harm himself by his intentional acts, if damage
willingly incurred is not harm (ibid., pp. 10 11). Rather than condemn all
interference with intentional self-regarding conduct, however, he breathes new
life into paternalism by redefining harm to mean simple setback to interest ,
willingly incurred or otherwise (ibid., p. 11). But that redefinition contradicts
not only the broad idea of harm which I have attributed to Mill, but also the
original revisionist idea, which Feinberg himself employs when referring to the
prevention of harm to others. Both of those ideas exclude damage or setback
willingly incurred. Feinberg s dubious strategy allows the paternalist to claim
legitimately that he is concerned to prevent harm to self, even if the putative
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GENERAL I SSUES
victim wishes to act as he does and does not agree that his interests, as perceived
by himself rather than by other people, are likely to suffer any setback.
Moreover, despite his avowed anti-paternalism, Feinberg, like Hart, seems
attracted at times to what, for a Millian, can only be seen as paternalism. Part
of the explanation for this might be that he ties paternalism to benevolent
motivations (ibid., pp. 17 18). Non-benevolent meddling with someone s
conduct solely for his own good is apparently seen as non-paternalistic, having
an alternative rationale in pure moralism the view that the conduct is
inherently immoral, regardless of its consequences.
At the same time, Feinberg seems to think that interference with conduct
that directly causes no perceptible damage to others against their wishes can at
times be justified in terms of prevention of harm or offence to them. He leaves
the impression, for example, that laws prohibiting the consumption of drugs
like opium, heroin and marijuana may be justified, if too many people engage in
such self-regarding conduct (ibid., pp. 17 23).
Soft (anti-) paternalism
Mill s absolute ban on paternalism can be compatible with what is often called
soft or weak paternalism. That milder sort of paternalism, which, as Feinberg
(ibid., pp. 14 15) remarks, is perhaps better viewed as anti-paternalism, is
meant to assure others that the individual has common knowledge of the likely
consequences of his proposed act, sufficient to permit the act to be classified as
a choice that could be made by a minimally rational agent.
Evidently, alternative criteria of rational choice will give rise to alternative
versions of the approach. Indeed, if suitably thick criteria are imposed, the
approach might merely serve as a guise for true ( hard or strong ) paternalism.
But thin criteria are apparently what Mill has in mind, whereby the individual
is aware of common beliefs about the consequences of acts, which any competent
person is expected to want to know before acting. Such knowledge might be
highly speculative, however, and will surely not obviate myriad mistakes on
the part of the decision-maker.
In any case, once assured that he possesses such information, others
must not interfere with the individual s self-regarding choices. Does the person
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THE LI BERTY DOCTRI NE I N PRACTI CE
intend to incur the risk of self-injury which most believe is associated with
crossing a particular dangerous bridge, for example, or with consuming a particular
poisonous substance? By temporarily seizing him to warn him of the danger,
or by posting warning signs or labels without his consent, others may assure
themselves of his intentions, without really interfering with his liberty. Again,
liberty means acting as one wishes. But one does not wish to fall into the river,
perhaps, or to be made ill by the poison. If not, there is no interference with his
liberty in these cases. Moreover, by preventing unintentional self-injury, the
relevant interference does prevent harm to self. Indeed, far from meddling with
his freedom to choose as he pleases, those who interfere with him prevent
perceptible damage to another against his wishes.5
At the same time, of course, if a person is not minimally rational, true
paternalism is justified because the liberty principle does not apply. We can
never be confident that a child, or an insane adult or a savage barbarian,
understands the likely consequences of his behaviour. Thus, others must take
responsibility for that individual s good, with a view to developing his
intellectual and emotional capacities, if possible. Coercion is justified in these [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] - zanotowane.pl
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